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The Effect of Owner Birth Order on R&D Investments in Family Firms 
 
ABSTRACT 
The debate on whether family firms are risk-averse or risk-taking in R&D activities is yet 
inconclusive. Move beyond prior studies assuming family influence as a whole, this study aims to 
investigate the impact of a nascent but essential factor, family owner’s early life experience 
which is largely captured by their birth orders, on R&D investment decisions. Drawn on 
evolutionary theory related to birth order effect and family innovation literature, we 
conceptualize that birth order of family owners will affect how they perceive the preservation of 
socioemotional endowment and react to risk-taking strategy, namely R&D investment in this 
study. We propose that later-born family owners tend to be risk-takers and invest more in R&D 
projects compared with those who are earlier-borns. However, the proposed enduring birth order 
effect will also be hindered or promoted in the family firms where family management also sets 
boundaries. We further expect that the positive association between birth order and R&D 
investments is weakened and strengthened respectively when a family member is the chairperson 
on the board and when there is a presence of owner-CEO duality. We confirm our hypotheses by 
using a sample of 747 firm-year observations from Chinese listed family firms during the period 
of 2006-2014. The results confirm the role of “family” life in understanding of innovation 
heterogeneities among family firms, and we believe it also serves as a strong case to 
cross-pollinate ideas among family business, innovation strategy and family science which is 
much-needed in management and strategy area.  
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 “Family firms are affected by both the imprinting of the family and firm and 
environmental pressures for conformity and change.”  
---(Sharma, Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2019: 11) 
Firms are keen to engage in research and development (R&D) activities as it is recognized 
as an essential way to develop technological capabilities, create and sustain competitive 
advantages (e.g., Block, 2012; De Massis, Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2013; McDermott & 
O'Connor, 2002). However, it is debatable and complex when it comes to explain innovation 
activities among family firms, a unique organization form that are constantly making decisions in 
a deep intertwining of economic goals and non-economic goals, or so called the endowment of 
“socioemotional wealth (SEW)” (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, & 
Wright, 2015; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Gomez
‐Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Evidently, prior studies 
have inconclusive findings regarding how family firms behave in R&D investments. Some 
studies find that family firms tend to be risk-averse and underinvest in R&D given the mounting 
risks and uncertainties associated with R&D investments threatening their SEW (Block, 2012; 
Chen & Hsu, 2009; De Massis et al., 2013; Matzler, Veider, Hautz, & Stadler, 2015; Munari, 
Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010; Muñoz-Bullón & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011; Schmid, Achleitner, 
Ampenberger, & Kaserer, 2014). However, another stream proposes a contingent view and argues 
that whether R&D investments are risk-averse or risk-taking depends on how family firms 
interpret R&D investments against SEW under a certain context, such as performance gap or 
growth opportunities (Choi, Zahra, Yoshikawa, & Han, 2015; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), firm 
slack (Liu, Chen, & Wang, 2017), governance structure (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Duran, 
Kammerlander, Van Essen, & Zellweger, 2016; Sciascia, Nordqvist, Mazzola, & De Massis, 





2015), and generations stages (Duran et al., 2016; Kraiczy, Hack, & Kellermanns, 2015; Schmid 
et al., 2014).   
Regardless the divergent views among prior studies, it predominantly highlights that 
family ownership and family management as a whole are the center of understanding family 
firms’ R&D strategies. Surprisingly, given the importance of family influence on R&D 
investments, we have limited knowledge about how the family owner, especially their early life 
experience in a family, influences their decision-making on R&D investments. Such downplaying 
would hinder our understanding of heterogeneous R&D behaviors among family firms because, 
on the one hand, family owner is the important individual, who ultimately owns and may also 
manage the company (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Their life experience may shape who they are 
and hence may exercise substantial influence on firms’ strategies, such as R&D investments 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). On the other hand, compared with 
non-family firms, the distinct nature of family firms essentially arises from the ‘family’, “the 
most and enduring of all human social groupings” (Smith, Hamon, Ingoldsby, & Miller, 2012: 5), 
and where family owner grows and develops values and beliefs of interpreting and responding 
external environment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Sulloway, 1995). In this regard, family owners’ 
early life experience within the family would have persistent and enduring impact on their 
predispositions toward risks and their strategic decisions in the later life (Campbell, Jeong, & 
Graffin, 2019; Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010). To fill the gap, this study extends existing 
literature by purposively focusing on family owner’s birth order, which largely captures the early 
life experience of an individual within a family environment (Sulloway, 1999), and its impact on 
family firms’ R&D investments. 





Birth order, or the “relative rank of a child in terms of the age hierarchy among siblings in 
the family,” (Steelman, 1985: 354) has been of great interest to the public and evolutionary 
psychology scholars (e.g., Booth & Kee, 2009; Steelman, 1985; Sulloway, 1995). Various studies 
suggest that birth order is one of the most influential factors capturing individual’s early-life 
within a family domain and predicting various individual behaviors (Jaskiewicz, Combs, Shanine, 
& Kacmar, 2017; Sulloway, 1995, 1996a, 2001). Importantly, few organizational studies have 
started to link birth order to leadership succession and its performance in family firms (Calabrò, 
Minichilli, Amore, & Brogi, 2018; Kimhi, 1997; Schenkel, Yoo, & Kim, 2016). This implicitly 
highlights that, if we understand the birth order effects on family firms’ strategic behaviors, we 
could have a comprehensive understanding of family firms’ strategy and performance 
heterogeneities once the successor is decided based on birth order (Calabrò et al., 2018). Building 
on evolutionary psychology, SEW perspective and innovation literature, we thus attempt to shift 
focus of family ownership and management as a whole to the individual’s early life experience 
within a family domain by developing theory to explain how family owners’ birth order 
influences their interpretations of R&D investments using SEW as a frame of reference.  
Drawn on Darwin’s theory of natural selection (Darwin, 1968), a key finding from 
evolutionary psychology theory is that siblings are biologically driven to compete with each other 
for parental investments or fulfill “family niches”  (Sulloway, 1995, 1999, 2001). To garner 
parental favor, siblings tend to differentiate themselves in an effort to minimize direct 
competition (Darwin, 1968; Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1974). Evidently, siblings’ strategies vary 
with birth order because birth order “causes siblings to experience family relationship in 
dissimilar ways and to pure different ways of maximizing their parent’s investments” Sulloway 
(1999: 190). As a result of birth order, individuals will develop different dispositions and 





tendencies that will have enduring and persistent impact on how they make decisions in the 
adulthood (Sulloway, 1995, 1996b). Relevantly, birth order studies have noted that birth order can 
have significant impact on individuals’ risk-taking behaviors (e.g., Bertoni & Brunello, 2016; 
Gilliam & Chatterjee, 2011; Sulloway, 1994; Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010). Building on this 
logic, we conceptualize that birth order shapes family owner’s tolerance of risks, which, in turn, 
will affect their interpretation of R&D investments against SEW. Parents invest more in 
earlier-borns children which makes earlier-born siblings are endowed with heavier familial roles 
and tend to identify more closely with parents and authority (Sulloway, 2001; Sulloway & 
Zweigenhaft, 2010). For this reason, earlier-borns are more conforming, conventional and 
defensive which make them family protecters and conservative decision makers. In contrast, 
later-born siblings tend to have less parental investments which make them usually differentiate 
themselves through engaging in risk-taking activities for currying parent favor (Campbell, Jeong, 
& Graffin, 2018; Saad, Gill, & Nataraajan, 2005; Sulloway, 1996b, 2001; Sulloway & 
Zweigenhaft, 2010). As SEW is a primary frame of reference of decision-making in family firms 
(Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007), 
we expect that earlier-born siblings tend to label R&D as a threat to SEW while later-born 
siblings are more tolerated with risks and less concerned with SEW. Therefore, we propose that 
the ascending birth order of family owners may be related to higher R&D investment in family 
firms. 
Family ownership alone cannot make strategic decisions into full execution (Sirmon, 
Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008). Indeed, R&D investments decisions should be a joint interactions 
between family owner and family members’ managerial presence in the organization, namely 
family management (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Sirmon et al., 2008). Therefore, we 





further contend that the enduring birth order impact on R&D investments is contingent on two 
important but contrasting conditions. First, family owner may sense high level of concern on 
SEW from other family members on board (Matzler et al., 2015), especially when the family 
member is the chairperson. Second, family owners could also enjoy superior managerial 
discretion in decision-makings when they are also the CEO in the company, so called owner-CEO 
duality (Duran et al., 2016). We expect that family member as chairperson may hinder the 
positive impact of birth order on R&D investment because family owners’ concerns on 
preserving SEW becomes salient. In contrast, when owners are also CEOs in the company, their 
risk-tolerances are significantly manifested because of increased discretion for making decisions 
and allocating resources for strategy implementation (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Kim, Kim, & 
Lee, 2008). Hence, we expect a stronger effect of birth order on R&D investment under the 
presence of owner–CEO duality. 
We collected 747 firm-year observations of Chinese family listed firms from 2006 to 2014 
and found full empirical support for our theoretical predictions. Our study makes three primary 
contributions. First, given the inconclusive debate on family firms’ R&D investments, we 
introduce a nascent but remarkable factor, the birth order of family owners in explaining 
heterogeneities among family firms’ R&D behaviors. Our conceptualization of family owners’ 
birth order shifts from the focus on family ownership and family management that has implicitly 
treated the family influence as a whole. Instead, built on evolutionary psychology theory, we find 
that family influence significantly varies with family owners’ characteristics, especially their 
early life experience (i.e., birth order). Our study reveals a new way to solve family 
influence-innovation debate by considering variances at the individual level. The significant 
moderating effects of the presence of family member as chairperson and owner–CEO duality 





strengthen our conceptualization of birth order effects and highlight the contrasting governance 
factors in shaping family owners’ risk-tolerances toward R&D investments. These further echoes 
the recent call for exploring heterogeneities among family firms for better understanding family 
firms’ behaviors rather than simply comparing family firms with non-family firms and assuming 
family firms are homogenous as a group (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012). Our integration 
of evolutionary psychology and family business also contributes to the promising stream calling 
for incorporating evolutionary psychology to resolve empirical debates in family business studies 
(Nicholson, 2008a; Yu, Stanley, Li, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2019). Second, by adding 
“family” life into family business research, we can better explain why variances of individuals 
lead to various managerial decisions in the family business studies, highlighting familial factors 
as part of the organizational landscape (Dyer, 2003; Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). Third, we also 
advance context-sensitive SEW which suggest that SEW is not constant but varies with different 
contexts (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2015; Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 
2014). 
  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Birth Order Effects in Evolutionary Psychology  
Birth order studies have their strongest momentum in evolutionary psychology (Schooler, 
1972; Sulloway, 1995). Darwin (1968)’s nature selction theory provides the theoretical 
foundations for evolution psychology by suggesting that human beings adapt to their 
environment over time. During the adaptation process, especially in a family, sibling–sibling 
conflicts (or sibling rivalry) are one of the basic principal in the evolutionary process (Darwin, 
1968; Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1974). That is, siblings are biologically driven to compete for 





maximizing parental investments. In doing so, children must strategize for safeguarding access to 
parental resources and stake out a unique “family niche” to increase survival success (Darwin, 
1859; Dunn & Plomin, 1990; Hamilton, 1964; Sulloway, 1995; Trivers, 1974). Even “parents 
normally encourage equal sharing among their offspring, offspring will generally prefer to 
acquire more of any scarce resource than they give to a sibling”, (Sulloway, 1996a: 60). Such 
sibling rivalry can be observed throughout species including humans and sometimes ends in an 
extreme, infanticide, a phenomenon that is widespread among insects, fish, birds, and mammals 
(Sulloway, 1996a).  
Since parental attention and resources are unevenly distributed, siblings develop different 
strategies to maximize parental favor. This is why birth order plays a role in behaviors because 
birth order “causes siblings to experience family relationship in dissimilar ways and to pure 
different ways of maximizing their parent’s investments” Sulloway (1999: 190). In other words, 
birth order differences across individuals arise “as a result of how children are raised (functional 
birth order, or rearing order) rather than the sequence in which they are born (Sulloway, 1999: 
189). As a result of birth order, individuals will develop different dispositions and tendencies 
toward external environment and approaches to respond (Sulloway, 1995, 1996b). Evidently, a 
vast number of studies have linked birth order to individual’s personality traits (e.g., Hertwig, 
Davis, & Sulloway, 2002; Sulloway, 1996a). Building on these, a growing number of research 
has particularly investigated birth order effects on risk-taking behaviors (Sulloway, 1995, 1996a, 
2001; Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010), such as participation in risky sports (Sulloway & 
Zweigenhaft, 2010), risky adolescent behaviors (Argys, Rees, Averett, & Witoonchart, 2006), and 
financial investments (Gilliam & Chatterjee, 2011).  





Given birth order capturing individual’s early family life, it is surprising that family 
business research has not more fully embraced of it. Only a few exceptions that linked birth order 
to leadership succession in family firms (Nicholson, 2008a, b). In terms of leadership succession, 
studies find that choosing the eldest son to be successor is more likely when there is a high level 
of SEW endowment because he/she may maximize family continuity (Barnes, 1988; Calabrò et 
al., 2018; Schenkel et al., 2016). In this study, we incorporate insights from evolutionary 
psychology on birth order effects and argue that birth order shapes family owner’s interpretation 
of R&D investments using SEW as a frame of reference offering a novel explanation of 
heterogeneities on R&D investments across family firms. 
SEW Logic and R&D Investments 
Socioemotional wealth (SEW), which is defined as the “non-financial aspects of the firm 
that meet the family’s needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty” (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007: 106), is undoubtedly the unique 
nature of family firms compared with other organizational forms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
According to SEW logic, it suggests that family firms strive to preserve and enhance the family’s 
SEW, which includes nonfinancial aspects or “affective endowments,” apart from economic 
considerations (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007). The 
SEW logic offers a theoretically grounded explanation of behaviors observed in family firms 
such as succession (Minichilli et al., 2014), risk-taking (Gomez ‐ Mejia et al., 2007), 
diversification (Gomez‐Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010), and CSR (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, 
& Larraza-Kintana, 2010) (See detailed reviews from Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) and Berrone et 
al. (2012)). It is implicitly assumed in the existing family business studies that SEW is “a key 





criterion, or at least one that has a greater priority, is whether their socioemotional endowment 
will be preserved” (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007:11). In other words, SEW gains or losses are a 
critical frame of reference for decision making (Berrone et al., 2012). Similarly, this is also the 
case when investigating family firms’ engagement in R&D investments (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011).  
Most literature finds that family firms tend to be conservative in R&D investments 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Duran et al., 2016; Muñoz-Bullón & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011) (For a 
comprehensive review, see De Massis et al. (2013)). Considering the preservation of SEW, family 
members’ altruism (i.e., the tendency to undertake actions that help family heirs) and wealth 
control orientation will evoke risk-aversion and underinvestment in R&D (Duran et al., 2016; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). These are consistent with Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) 
who suggests that family firms will be more risk-averse when they feel that they may lose a great 
deal of wealth. On contrary, some studies also find that family firms embrace risky decisions due 
to family firms’ long-term perspective and nature alignment interests between owners and 
managers, thereby mitigating principal-agent problems (Ashwin, Krishnan, & George, 2015). 
However, some other studies take a contingent view and suggest that risk-taking or risk-averse 
depends on the framing of R&D in a certain context. For example, Chrisman and Patel (2012) 
find that family firms tend to engage more in R&D investments than nonfamily firms when the 
gap between aspirations and performance is negative. Gomez‐Mejia et al. (2014) find that the 
increasing institutional investor ownership weakens the negative relationship between family 
ownership and R&D investments because the presence of institutional owners make family firms 
more sensitive to the necessity of gains from R&D and negative effects of underinvestment. 





Other studies also find that resources slack (Liu et al., 2017), governance structure (Chen & Hsu, 
2009; Duran et al., 2016; Sciascia et al., 2015), and generations stages (Duran et al., 2016; 
Kraiczy et al., 2015; Schmid et al., 2014) shapes family firms’ view of R&D against SEW.  
Family owner birth order and R&D investment  
R&D investments are assumed to be pivotal for firms’ competitive advantages. Family 
firms are no exception. However, R&D projects are significantly long-term, highly uncertain, 
sunk-cost investments (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Chrisman et al., 2015; Lee & O'neill, 2003) with no 
fixed timeline or even certainty for payoffs (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Munari et al., 2010). For 
these reasons, R&D projects requires significant level of risks tolerance from decision-makers in 
the organization. Such tolerance of risks may vary with birth order.  
Building on the evolutionary psychology and family innovation literature, we thus relate 
family owner birth order to R&D investments because birth order influences the extent to which 
individuals may engage in risk-taking behaviors to deal with sibling competition for recalibrating 
parental investments. This tendency to engage in risky behaviors in the childhood should have 
profound and engrained influence on how they respond to external environment in their 
adulthood (Sulloway, 2001). For this reason, we argue that earlier-borns are more likely to 
interpret R&D investments as a threat to SEW than later-borns.  
In comparison with younger siblings, earlier-borns normally receive more family attention 
and care, are endowed with more familial responsibilities and expected to work for the 
continuation of the family (Campbell et al., 2019; Saad et al., 2005; Sulloway, 1996a). For 
example, earlier-borns have initial favored status in the sibling hierarchy and will be more like 
their parents, more adherent to principles, more conservative and cautious (Paulhus, Trapnell, & 
Chen, 1999; Saroglou & Fiasse, 2003; Sulloway, 1995, 1996a), and inherently should not be 





“taking unnecessary chances”. For example, Gilliam and Chatterjee (2011) find that earlier-borns 
shows significantly less risk tolerance than later-born individuals. Instead, earlier-borns are 
expected to inherit and manage the family firm acting a role of family nurturers and protectors 
(Calabrò et al., 2018). Consequently, when deciding on R&D investments, they tend to adhere to 
SEW logic and avoid risk for the sake of protecting the familial wealth. In addition, because of 
their already privileged family position, they would be foolhardy to invest substantially in R&D 
projects and risk losing much family wealth, especially if they lack the needed skills and would 
might lose their status if they share control with nonfamily investors (Chrisman et al., 2015; 
McDermott & O'Connor, 2002; Sulloway, 1995). 
In contrast, later-born siblings tend to have less-established roles in the family which 
drives them to compete with the established status of their older siblings (Sulloway, 1999). 
Studies have noted that to garner parents’ resources and attention, later-borns normally find 
unique ways to distinguish themselves, perhaps by challenging parental authority and supporting 
“radical” revolutions (Sulloway, 1995, 1996a; Zweigenhaft & Von Ammon, 2000). Through 
persistent differentiating practices in the past, they tend to be rebellious, innovative, revolutionary 
and risk-taking (Healey & Ellis, 2007; Schenkel et al., 2016; Sulloway, 1996a; Zweigenhaft & 
Von Ammon, 2000). For example, using a meta-analysis, Sulloway and Zweigenhaft (2010) find 
that laterborns are more likely to participate in risky sports. Bertoni and Brunello (2016) note that 
although earlier-born can have better wage in the beginning because of higher education, 
later-borns enjoy higher wage growth because of their higher propensity to take risks, such as 
changing jobs more frequently than later-borns. Following this, we expect laterborns tend to 
tolerate more risks and label R&D as less threatening to SEW.  





In summary, since birth orders tend to cause significantly different tolerations of risks, 
earlier-born owners may be more likely to discourage highly risky R&D investments to preserve 
SEW endowments, while later-born owners may be more active R&D investors, leading us to 
propose: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the ascending birth order of the family owner is positively 
associated with R&D investments in family firms. 
Hindering Risk-Taking: Family Member as the Chairperson on the Board 
Boards of directors question, advise and monitor important decisions including R&D 
investments within the company. When the focal owner’s family member is the chairperson on 
the board, the family owner must frequently interact with the family member on firm’s strategic 
issues, which, in turn, will have compelling impact on family owner’s preferences in decision 
making (Miller, Le Breton‐Miller, & Lester, 2011). In family firms, family members’ demands to 
ensure continuity and control of family business which call forth among family officers to be 
family nurturers and prioritize preserving SEW in decision-makings (König, Kammerlander, & 
Enders, 2013; Munari et al., 2010). As such, the presence of a family member in the chairperson 
position actually represents and reinforce the importance of preserving SEW. Particularly in R&D 
investment context which is high-risk and objectionable, the family chairperson will be very 
concerned about any risk-taking behaviors proposed by family owner and thus have strong 
incentive to ensure a proper preservation of SEW in the family. In addressing these demands, 
although later-borns tend to be R&D risk-takers and believe the risk will pay off in the end, they 
will be discouraged to do so because it is potentially against family firms’ favored strategy 
(conservation), and family member in the chairperson position will express pressures to the focal 
family owner. Even R&D projects are promising, given its high potential loss to SEW, family 





member in the chairperson position will consistently remind and question the focal owner’s 
decisions, requiring them to put substantial effort in persuading them from both economic and 
non-economic perspective  (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007). Therefore, 
for earlier-borns, they enjoy risk-adverse alignment with their family member. However, for 
risk-tolerate later-borns, they tend to be more concerned of preserving SEW, which in turn, 
suppress their risk-taking preferences and hinder investments in R&D.  
In contrast, when the chairperson is not from the family, risk-taking later-born owners will 
be less aware of SEW and found it easier to persuade board members to invest in long-term and 
promising R&D projects particularly from an economic perspective. Taken together, we 
anticipate that the positive birth order effect on R&D investments is weakened when there is a 
presence of a family member as the chairperson on the board: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, ascending birth order of the family owner will have a 
weaker positive relationship with R&D investments when a family member is the 
chairperson on the board. 
Promoting Risk-Taking: Family Owner-CEO Duality 
Considering that birth order affects tolerances to take risks, we also expect that the impact 
of birth order on R&D investment is contingent on family firms’ ability to realize and implement 
risky decisions; that is, whether they have enough managerial discretion to direct and allocate 
resources to support risk-taking strategies and buffer R&D investment shocks (Chrisman et al., 
2015; De Massis, Kotlar, Chua, & Chrisman, 2014).  
When family owners are also company CEOs, their powerful positions grant them higher 
discretion to pursue opportunities that might be counter to both economically rational investment 
decisions and SEW (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; König et al., 2013). On the 





one hand, later-born owners can save much effort in pursuing their risk-taking ambitions without 
constantly being questioned by the board (Schmid et al., 2014). Instead, they benefit from the 
nature alignment between owners and managers which provides an effective leadership to the 
firm and reduces the confusions inside and outside stakeholders (Ashwin et al., 2015; Baliga et 
al., 1996). On the other hand, the owner-manager also has stronger incentives to monitor the 
management of firm assets (Block, 2012). To make sure the success of R&D investment, 
later-born owners can use their high discretion to allocate sufficient resources to support their 
decisions and be highly confident of innovation output (Zahra, 2005). For these reasons, they will 
have stronger preferences for risk-taking R&D. In contrast, when later-born owners are not CEOs, 
they may face excessive pressures and monitoring from the board given the mounting risks 
associated with R&D investments (Duran et al., 2016; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007), which will 
evoke enhanced agency costs for seeking support and restrictions on the latitude of managerial 
actions and decisions. Consequently, tendencies to undertake substantial R&D investment will be 
hindered. We therefore propose, 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, ascending birth order of the family owner has a stronger 
positive relationship with R&D investments when the family owner is also the CEO. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data 
We obtained the original sample of all family firms listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange of China between 2006 and 2014 from China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database. Although there are variations in the definition of family business, a 
general agreement is that family owners are in the position to exercise decisive power on key 





governance choices and strategies of the firm (Chua et al., 1999; Duran et al., 2016). Following 
this, we operationalized family firms as firms in which the ultimate owner is a family member or 
a family. Some studies proposed a minimum of 5 percent of the shares in the study (e.g., Peng & 
Jiang, 2010). In order to ensure that family group holds substantial portion of voting stock, we 
followed Chrisman and Patel (2012), Gomez‐Mejia et al. (2010) and La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999), and used 10%1 control rights share in the company as a cut-off. We took 
2006 as the initial sample year because in 2006 China issued new accounting standards that 
required listed companies to disclose R&D investment information in their annual reports. As 
China government announced a change in the existing one-child policy to two-child policy in 
2015, we limited our sample to the period of 2003 and 2014 to avoid external policy influences 
on our results. As such, during the period 2006 to 2014, our sample is under the period of 
one-child policy.  
To test our hypotheses, we need detailed family background information such as birth 
order and the number of siblings. We used the full name of the ultimate family owner from the 
CSMAR database and manually collected family information from (a) all the prospectus and 
annual reports of sample firms as China Securities Regulatory Commission requires public firms 
to disclose detailed personal information of the chairperson as well as his or her relatives who 
engage in family firm management in the prospectus (Yu et al., 2019); (2) Internet: we used 
search engine such as Baidu (i.e., largest search engine in China) and Google to search sibling 
information in any public sources such as corporate official websites, specialized press articles, 
and books (e.g., corporate books or documentaries); 3) social networks such as LinkedIn. To 
 
1 For sensitivity test, we also used 20% and 30% as a cutoff point. The details will be discussed in the Robust Tests 
section.  





make sure accuracy and consistency of the sibling information, we cross-checked the above 
different sources. As there is no compulsory rules of disclosing detailed family information for 
family firms in China and the sensitive nature of the data, similar as other studies (e.g., Calabrò et 
al., 2018; Campbell et al., 2019), it should be noted that there are significant challenges in 
collecting sibling information for all family firms. For this reason, the potential biases may arise 
from some family firms that their family information is not publicly available. Therefore, we will 
adopt Heckman two-stage model to correct for such concerns and will be discussed in the 
Estimation method section. In addition, as our focus in the study is the birth order effect of the 
family owner, we strictly excluded firms whose family owner is from an only-child family as 
there is no birth order effect in this case (Campbell et al., 2019).  
We also drew data regarding institutional development from the marketization index of 
the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan, Wang, & Zhu, 2011). Firm basic 
information (e.g., industry, establish year, and headquarter location), accounting information (e.g., 
sales, assets, debt and ROA) and corporate governance data (e.g., board information and family 
ownership) were collected from the CSMAR database. After excluding heavily regulated 
financial firms, ST firms that faced high delisting risk, firms that issued debt exceeding asset 
value, cross-listed firms that faced different regulation environments, or firms with missing data, 
our final sample included 747 firm-year observations of 188 family listed firms between 2006 
and 2014. We took one-year time lag between independent and control variables, and the 
dependent variables to mitigate endogeneity concerns.  
Measures 
Dependent variable. Following the widely-established measures in previous studies (e.g., 
Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014; Greve, 2003; Kim et al., 2008), we measured 





R&D intensity as the percentage of R&D expenditure over total sales. This measure captures a 
firm’s commitment to innovation which is well suited with our framework (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 
2014; Lee & O'neill, 2003). It also allows us to compare R&D investments between companies in 
the analyses (Chen & Hsu, 2009).  
Independent variable. Our independent variable is denoted as owner birth order. 
Following Campbell et al. (2018), we adopted an ordinal measure for owner birth order. It took 
the value of 1 for the firstborn owner, 2 for a second-born, 3 for a third-born etc. Alternatively, 
we also developed a birth order ratio by considering the size of owner’s family in the Robust 
Tests section (Booth & Kee, 2009).  
Moderating variables. The first moderator indicates whether the chairperson is from 
owner’s family. We developed a dummy variable, Family member chairperson, which equals to 
one if any family members except the focal owner is in the chairperson position and zero 
otherwise. Following Chrisman and Patel (2012), we defined family member as a person related 
by blood or by marriage to the owning family. The second moderating variable for testing 
Hypothesis 3 is the Owner-CEO duality. We developed an indicator variable that equals one if the 
family owner also serves as the CEO in the focal firm, and zero otherwise (Zahra, 2005).  
Control variables. Aligned with studies regarding the determinants of corporate R&D 
investment, we included three sets of control variables that may systematically impact family 
firms’ R&D activities. We firstly controlled for family-level variables in our model. We 
controlled for the number of siblings as family size shapes parents’ resources allocated to the 
owner which may confound with our birth order effect (Booth & Kee, 2009; Campbell et al., 
2019). We measured The number of siblings as the total count of siblings of the focal family 
owner. We also controlled for Family ownership, measured as the proportion of equity held by 





family members in the focal firm. Family ownership has been a long-lasting and factor in 
influencing family firms’ innovation strategies (Beck, Janssens, Debruyne, & Lommelen, 2011; 
Chrisman & Patel, 2012). The first generation’s decision making generally rests with the founder 
who is centralized in decision making while it may change over time as succeeding generation 
join the family firm management (Beck et al., 2011; Kraiczy, Hack, & Kellermanns, 2014). We 
controlled for Generation, an indicator variable, which equals one if any later generation family 
member serves as one of top managers except for the founder, and zero otherwise. At the firm 
level, we accounted for Firm age measured as the number of years since foundation (Beck et al., 
2011). Older firms are expected to be more conservative in risk-taking strategies. We controlled 
for firm size (measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s number of employees) as it affect 
firms affect resource endowment for R&D investments (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014; Sciascia et al., 
2015). Aligned with prior literature (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014; Greve, 
2003), we measured Financial slack as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Firms with 
high levels of financial slack have more resources available for risk-taking innovation strategies. 
R&D investments also needs immediate cash to support on-going R&D activities. Thus, we also 
controlled for Cash which was measured as the ratio of cash assets to total assets (Block, 2012; 
Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014). If firms performed better in the last year, they are more positive in 
engaging high-risk R&D investments with sufficient resources. Therefore, we controlled for 
Prior performance which was measured by return on assets achieved (ROA) in the prior year 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Yu et al., 2019). We also accounted for board size, measured by the 
number of directors on the board (Campbell et al., 2019). Recent studies have shown that lone 
founder firms are more entrepreneurial and pursue superior R&D investments (Block, 2012; 





Miller et al., 2011). We included a dummy Lone founder which equals 1 if the focal family firm is 
the lone founder firm and 0 otherwise. According to Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and 
Cannella Jr (2007) and Miller et al. (2011), lone founder firms are defined as firms which one of 
the firm’s founder is active as an executive or major shareholder and no relatives of the founder 
are involved in the business as top managers or large shareholders. At the region level, we also 
controlled for Institutional development as there is a large institutional development disparities 
across regions in China which may influence firms’ motivation to innovate and accessibility to 
local government’s preferential policies and resources (Peng, 2003). We used regional 
marketization index from NERI which have been extensively used to measure institutional 
development in different regions in China (e.g., Kafouros, Wang, Piperopoulos, & Zhang, 2015; 
Zhou, Gao, & Zhao, 2017). Finally, we included two-digit industry dummies and year dummies 
to control for industry-related variance and time-dependent variations.  
Estimation method 
We employed feasible generalized least squares (GLS) estimation method with a 
first-order autoregressive AR(1) and heteroskedastic error structure to test our hypotheses (e.g., 
Cannella Jr, Park, & Lee, 2008; Souder, Zaheer, Sapienza, & Ranucci, 2017; Yang, Zheng, & 
Zhao, 2014). We lagged all firm-level variables to alleviate the endogeneity problem of reverse 
causality.  
As mentioned above, sample selection bias may be present among firms due to the 
missing value of birth order information (Heckman, 1979). We therefore adopted Heckman 
two-stage model to account for such potential nonrandom sampling bias. Our first-stage probit 
model predicted the presence of birth order information of the family owner. As shown in Panel B 
of the Table 1A, the coefficients on Rich list (p < 0.001) and Corporate donation (p < 0.05) is 





significant and positive, suggesting the validity of our instruments. We then included the 





Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of main variables and their correlations. The mean 
value of R&D intensity is 4%, much lower than 10.40% reported in Block (2012) based on family 
firms in the S&P 500, which clearly suggests that Chinese family firms are relatively reluctant to 
invest in risky R&D projects. The mean value of birth order of owner is 1.5 and family owners 
are also CEOs in 36.0% of sample family firms. Only 16% of family firms are showing more 
than one generation are managing family firms together, which confirms that China’s family 
firms are younger than western firms.  Regarding the correlation matrix of main variables, the 
highest correlation is between Owner birth order and The number of siblings (r = 0.629, p < 0.01). 
This is expected because a later birth order is possibly only to the extent that family size increases 
(Campbell et al., 2019). We calculated the average variance inflation factor (VIFs) for each model 
and the highest average VIF is 2.18 and the maximum value for any variables is 5.24, less than 
the common cut-off point of 10 (Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Therefore, the problem of 
multicollinearity is not a major concern for this study.   
/Insert Table 1 about here/ 
Regression Results Analysis  
Table 2 presents the GLS regression results predicting R&D intensity. Hypothesis 1 
proposes that family owner as laterborns are more likely to engage in higher levels of R&D 





investments than earlier-borns. In Model 2 of Table 2, the coefficient on owner birth order is 
positive and significant (β = 0.0021, p = 0.012), confirming that under later-born owners, R&D 
investment intensity will increase by an average of 5.25% (=0.0021/0.04) relative to the mean of 
R&D intensity. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is well supported. 
/Insert Table 4 about here/ 
    Hypothesis 2 predicts that the presence of other family member as chairperson on board will 
negatively moderate the positive relationship between birth order and R&D investments. The 
regression coefficient on the interaction term owner birth order × Family member chairperson 
is significantly negative in Model 3 (β = -0.0065, p = 0.000), suggesting that the presence of 
family member as the chairperson weakens the positive association between birth order and R&D 
investment, supporting Hypothesis 2. In contrast, the interaction term owner birth order × 
Owner-CEO duality is positive and significant in Model 4 (β = 0.0092, p = 0.000), which 
indicates that the presence of owner-CEO duality enhances the positive impact of birth order on 
R&D investment, supporting Hypothesis 3. The full model in Model 5 shows similar results and 
provides consistent support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
/Insert Table 2 about here/ 
To interpret our results in a visionary way, holding all other variables at their means, we 
calculated the adjusted predictions on the relationship between owner birth order and R&D 
investment. We used STATA Command ‘margins’ and ‘marginsplot’ to plot the estimates in 
Figure 1, 2 and 3 for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Note that birth order in our sample is 
from 1 to 7. As Figure 1 shows, owner birth order is positively associated with R&D investment 
intensity. In Figure 2, it plots the moderating effect of the presence of family member as the 





chairperson. As shown in Figure 2, when the chairperson position is taken by one of owner’s 
family members, the positive relationship between owner birth order and R&D investment 
intensity is weaker (see the flatter slope of the solid line than the dotted line in Figure 2), further 
supporting the negative moderating effect of family member chairperson in Hypothesis 2. As 
Figure 3 shows, owner birth order has a much stronger positive relationship with R&D 
investments intensity when owner is also the CEO in the company (see the steeper slope of the 
solid line than the dotted line in Figure 3).  
/Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here/ 
 
DISCUSSION 
Birth order, capturing individual’s early life in the family domain, have substantial impact 
on R&D investment decisions. Drawing on evolutionary psychology and family innovation 
literature, we find evidence that family owners who are later-borns are more actively investing in 
R&D projects. We also conjecture that such positive relationship is suppressed when there is a 
presence of family member as the chairperson on the board. In contrast, when there is a presence 
of owner-CEO duality in family firms, the positive birth order effects on R&D investments is 
strengthened. Our theorizing and results make following primary contributions to the literature. 
First, we introduce birth order as a pivotal but largely ignored micro factor to reconcile 
the debate on the paradox of family firms’ innovation. Although prior studies have provided a 
wealth of insights to understand family innovation behaviors, dominate research has largely 
focused on how family ownership or family management (i.e., family influence) affect R&D 
investments and have inconclusive findings (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; De Massis et al., 2013; 
Duran et al., 2016; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007). We argue that such 





implicitly treating family influence as a whole in previous studies will downplay the important 
individual differences, especially individual’s early life experience, which actually account for 
large variances on family firms’ R&D investments. Built on evolutionary psychology (EP), we 
move beyond family influence as a whole and investigate the family owner’s birth order, which 
captures risk-tolerances variances of decision-makers. We theorize birth order reflects how 
sibling compete in a family, and this in turn, shapes sibling’s risk-taking tendencies in their 
adulthood. Specifically, we find that firstborn siblings are more conservative about R&D 
investment, while later-born siblings are more likely to be active innovators. This is of great 
importance to provide a nascent explanation to prior mixed findings. At the same time, we also 
suggest future research on exploring micro-level/individual-level heterogeneities of major 
decision makers is much needed when studying innovation heterogeneities among family firms.  
Second, our studies also respond to the emerging and persistent call for focusing studies 
on sources of heterogeneities across family firms rather than on differences between the 
“average” family firm and the “average” nonfamily firm, assuming family firms are homogenous 
groups rather than may vary in behaviors as much as or more than non-family firms (Chua et al., 
2012). The homogenous assumption  “produced results plagued by persistent inconsistencies 
and contradictions” (Chua et al., 2012: 1111), and in reality “does not exist, are often 
overgeneralized with limited explanatory power”(Chua et al., 2012). This issue is salient in 
family innovation literature where most studies have failed to consider the heterogeneities across 
family firms that may substantially contribute to divergent R&D investment decisions (Chrisman 
& Patel, 2012; De Massis et al., 2013). Aligned with few scholars who have emphasized family 
firm heterogeneities (Chrisman et al., 2015; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Duran et al., 2016), we 
suggest that birth orders of family owners and its interaction with family management factors (i.e., 





family member as chairperson and owner-CEO duality) cause substantial variabilities across 
family firms.  
Third, by adding “family” life into family business research, we shift the conversation 
around business to integrate the family dynamics in understanding variances of R&D investments 
in family business studies (Dyer, 2003; Jaskiewicz et al., 2017). Although it is well-accepted that 
family firms differ from non-family firms in that they simultaneously operate under business and 
familial principles (Chua et al., 1999; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007), there is a dearth of research 
incorporating “family” side of the story. As noted, “If organizational scholars do not account for 
the family as a variable in their research, they will be incapable of accounting for the behavior of 
a significant population of organizations they purport to understand”, (Dyer, 2003: 404). Given 
there are increasing attention on family elements, most of them still focus on family ties and 
goals values (Belenzon, Patacconi, & Zarutskie, 2016; Dyer, 2003). In our study, our 
conceptualization of birth order effects extend family elements and shows a strong case to 
consider family member’s early life experience in the family domain, where individual is raised 
and develop preferences and approaches to external environment (Sulloway, 2001). Specifically, 
follow one exception using EP theory to investigate CEO selection and executive compensation 
among family firms (Yu et al., 2019), our application of EP also shows a good fit to explain how 
family dynamics (i.e., birth order) shapes R&D investment decisions. As noted by Nicholson 
(2008b:74), “The goal of EP theory and research is to identify and analyze the contents of our 
evolved human nature, understand how they are reflected in everyday social life and experience, 
and consider the implications for human well-being, effectiveness, and change”. Overall, we 
believe our research responds to the recent call for leveraging family science theories (Jaskiewicz 





et al., 2017) and psychological perspective (Sharma et al., 2019) to understand family firms’ 
behaviors.  
Lastly, our findings advance the SEW perspective by validating SEW boundaries in 
family business studies. Although SEW is a “homegrown” lens for comparing the strategic 
decisions of family firms and non-family firms, the application of SEW is sensitive to contexts 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Minichilli et al., 2014; Naldi, Cennamo, Corbetta, & Gomez–Mejia, 2013), 
such as family ownership (Calabrò et al., 2018; Souder et al., 2017), performance hazard 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2014; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007), CEO 
characteristics (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Duran et al., 2016), and generations (Kraiczy et al., 2015; 
Schmid et al., 2014). Drawn on EP, our findings share the similar idea, but we further provide 
nascent evidence that SEW influences are individual-sensitive in having a stronger impact on 
earlier-born rather than on later-born family owners. That is, later-borns tend to be greater 
risk-takers with less SEW bounded. Thus, we add a new micro element to advance the SEW 
literature and explain why SEW guides some family firms more strongly than others (Berrone et 
al., 2012).  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As with all research, our study suffers from several limitations, which offer opportunities 
for future research. First, due to data availability, we were not able to have enough information on 
siblings in the family firms. Future studies could extend our research and invetigate different 
sibling rivary contingencies such as sibling age gaps an the death of siblings. Second, birth order 
can be viewed as both biological and psychological (Shulman & Mosak, 1977). That is, 
biological birth order changes when siblings are born or die, but psychological birth order most 





substantially influences individual personality. Our data restricted our test to biological birth 
order, while future research could deepen and expand our findings by considering psychological 
birth order. Second, risk to SEW may vary depending on whether R&D investments are 
exploitative or exploratory (Patel & Chrisman, 2014). We focused on overall R&D investments, 
so our research could be expanded to observe how birth order influences on different types of 
R&D investment, depending on available data. Finally, gender is a significant factor for 
considering the influence of birth order (Eckstein et al., 2010). However, as women are extremely 
underrepresented in our sample, we failed to explore the interaction effects between gender and 
birth order for R&D investment. Future research might focus on other countries where top 
management positions feature high gender diversity. 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variables  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. R&D investments intensity 0.040 0.05 1        
2. Owner birth order 1.50 0.94 -0 1       
3. Family member chairperson 0.07 0.26 -0.05 0.094 1      
4. Owner-CEO duality 0.36 0.48 0.232 -0.01 -0.194 1     
5. The number of siblings 2.80 1.20 -0.06 0.629 0.115 -0.014 1    
6. Family ownership 0.41 0.14 -0.01 -0.118 -0.03 0.15 -0.073 1   
7. Generation 0.16 0.37 -0.13 0.087 0.105 -0.119 0.043 -0.124 1  
8. Firm age 11.00 4.80 -0.08 0.024 0.156 -0.082 -0.054 -0.241 0.169 1 
9. Firm size 21.00 0.97 -0.14 0.206 0.004 -0.104 0.089 0.147 0.101 0.071 
10. Financial slack 3.60 8.70 0.181 0.001 0.076 0.067 -0.029 -0.012 0.016 0.09 
11. Cash 0.27 0.19 0.417 -0.119 -0.051 0.243 -0.094 0.184 -0.051 -0.096 
12. Prior performance 0.06 0.11 -0.02 -0.063 0.087 -0.05 -0.032 0.054 0.004 -0.014 
13. Board size 8.50 1.50 -0.03 0.047 0.013 -0.1 0.153 -0.078 0.119 0.04 
14. Lone founder 0.36 0.48 -0.05 0.204 -0.065 -0.085 0.063 -0.193 0.133 0.188 
15. Institutional environment 7.60 1.40 0.133 0.039 -0.011 0.136 -0.047 0.095 0.002 0.018 
16. Inverse Mills Ratio 1.30 0.22 0.204 -0.097 -0.042 0.143 -0.121 -0.306 0.053 0.384 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
9. Firm size 1        
10. Financial slack -0.143 1       
11. Cash -0.254 0.292 1      
12. Prior performance 0.056 0.003 -0.023 1     
13. Board size 0.235 -0.02 -0.04 0.023 1    
14. lone founder 0.029 -0.014 -0.132 -0.038 0.059 1   
15. Institutional environment 0.058 0.022 0.021 -0.061 -0.071 -0.13 1  
16. Inverse Mills Ratio -0.537 0.178 0.215 -0.108 -0.155 0.116 -0.084 1 
Note: Correlations greater than |0.071| are significant at p < .05.  
a Natural logarithm  






FGLS regression predicting R&D investments 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
The number of siblings 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Family ownership 0.0067* 0.0063* 0.0061* 0.0082** 0.0086** 
 (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Generation -0.0046*** -0.0053*** -0.0052*** -0.0041*** -0.0038*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Firm age -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0014*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Firm size 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Financial slack 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cash 0.0140*** 0.0179*** 0.0167*** 0.0197*** 0.0175*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Prior performance 0.0104*** 0.0112*** 0.0107*** 0.0111*** 0.0103*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0035) 
Board size 0.0005* 0.0005 0.0005* 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lone founder 0.0013 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Institutional environment 0.0026*** 0.0023*** 0.0025*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0301*** 0.0267*** 0.0282*** 0.0291*** 0.0301*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
Family members chairperson 0.0007 0.0024 0.0124*** 0.0017 0.0096** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0024) (0.0039) 
Owner-CEO duality 0.0018* 0.0024** 0.0024** -0.0099*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Owner birth order  0.0021** 0.0029*** 0.0001 0.0005 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Owner birth order*Family 
member chairperson   -0.0065***  -0.0044*** 
   (0.0016)  (0.0014) 
Owner birth 
order*Owner-CEO duality    0.0092*** 0.0080*** 
    (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Constant -0.0252 0.0253 0.0119 0.0351 0.0248 
 (0.0466) (0.0457) (0.0459) (0.0455) (0.0459) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 
The number of firms 188 188 188 188 188 
Chi-square 1.3e+03*** 1.1e+03*** 1.2e+03*** 2.9e+03*** 2.5e+03*** 
This table presents results using time–series feasible generalized least square (FGLS) model. Year and industry 
dummies are included in all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.  
 










Moderating effect of family member chairperson 
 

















APPENDIX TABLE A1 
Heckman First stage regression results 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics and correlations in the first stage  
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Firm sizea 21.14 1.10 1       
2. Firm age 11.99 5.41 0.0451 1      
3. Financial slack 3.42 6.49 -0.091 -0.0818 1     
4. Prior performance 0.06 1.06 0.0322 0.0033 0.0075 1    
5. Rich list 0.47 0.50 0.3919 0.0772 -0.0654 -0.0097 1   
6. Corporate donationa 8.06 6.06 0.4074 -0.0514 -0.0242 0.0125 0.1929 1  
7. Institutional environment 7.37 1.68 0.1337 -0.0226 0.0654 0.0079 0.0341 0.0968 1 
Note: Correlations greater than |0.023| are significant at p < .05.  
a Natural logarithm  
 
Panel B: Heckman first stage regression results  
  Model 1 
Firm size 0.0241 
 (0.558) 
Firm age -0.0187** 
 (0.018) 
Financial slack -0.0021 
 (0.677) 
Prior performance 0.0019 
 (0.813) 
Rich list 0.3748*** 
 (0.000) 
Corporate donation 0.0132** 
 (0.011) 





Log Likelihood -4.3e+03 
Wald Chi-square 76.2827*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummy and industry dummy are included.  
 * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.  
